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International publicity was crucial to the liberation of Southern Africa. As Matthew 
Connelly shows in Diplomatic Revolution, the innovators in this regard were the Algerian 
National Liberation Front (FLN), who used international fora effectively to achieve recognition 
for their cause in the context of the Cold War.1 The print media were crucial for the construction 
of modern nationalism, or "imagined communities",  the title of  Benedict Anderson’s seminal 
work.2 The post-war era ushered in a new age of global media that African revolutionaries were 
able to use  to capture international audiences.3 International solidarity networks were 
fundamental for this global outreach. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the Portuguese 
dictatorship started handing out an increasing number of scholarships for young men and women 
from Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde to study in universities across 
Portugal. The students were supposed to learn the ‘merits’ of Portuguese civilisation and return 
to occupy administrative posts across the Empire. Instead, many started to agitate for the 
‘rediscovery’ of African culture and to campaign for independence.  
As persecution of nationalist activism in Portugal and the colonies intensified, many 
student activists went into exile. In the 1950s, one group of activists from the Portuguese 
colonies—Mário Pinto de Andrade and Viriato da Cruz from Angola, Marcelino dos Santos 
from Mozambique, and Amílcar Cabral from Cape Verde—gathered in Paris, from where they 




supporters among European left-wing circles and from socialist countries. With Portugal’s 
prime minister, António de Oliveira Salazar, refusing to cede control of the colonies, in 1960,  
De Andrade, Da Cruz and Cabral were among those who moved to Conakry, Guinea, from 
where they started campaigns to harness support for the armed struggle against the Portuguese 
regime. Cabral did so on behalf of The African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape 
Verde (PAIGC). De Andrade and Da Cruz on behalf of the Popular Movement for the Liberation 
of Angola (MPLA).  
In February-March 1961, a large-scale popular uprising shook Angola, Portugal’s largest 
colony. The uprising and Portugal’s brutal retaliation hastened the need for African nationalists 
to launch armed struggle – or face competition from local rivals. In April of that year, 
representatives from the MPLA, PAIGC, and the lesser-known the National Democratic Union 
of Mozambique (UDENAMO), amongst others, met in Casablanca, Morocco.4 The participants 
established a new umbrella organization, the Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the 
Portuguese Colonies (CONCP) with headquarters in Rabat, Morocco, which was to serve as a 
publicity centre and a clearing house for inter-movement communication.5 CONCP intended to 
attract international attention to the problem of Portuguese colonialism in the aftermath of events 
in Angola and to strengthen its members through a transnational alliance.6 In 1962, Marcelino 
dos Santos played an important role in founding FRELIMO, the Front for the Liberation of 
Mozambique. Once the MPLA (1961), FRELIMO (1964) and PAIGC (1963) launched armed 
struggle in the early 1960s, they used a variety of media – print, radio, and television – to 
advertise their cause. They also started inviting foreign journalists to visit the so-called liberated 
areas. These efforts were crucial to attracting international attention to the cause and countering 
the official Portuguese narrative that the nationalist movements were little more than a bunch 




The Soviets turned their attention to the Third World after Nikita Khrushchev replaced 
Joseph Stalin as the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (hereafter CC CPSU) in 1953. A pragmatic party apparatchik, Khrushchev 
understood that the rapid pace of decolonization offered Moscow opportunities to gain new 
international allies. At the same time, Khrushchev had come of age during the interwar period—
the peak of the Comintern’s support for black liberation around the world. He was vested in the 
language of anti-racism and believed that the Soviets had a duty to help anti-colonial movements 
in the Third World. He hoped to revive socialism along so-called "Leninist " lines after he 
denounced Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in February 1956.7 The Soviets did 
not pay much attention to the Portuguese colonies until after the Angolan uprising. In 1961 that 
the Soviets offered the first assistance package to the MPLA, and by the mid-1960s, the Soviet 
Union and their allies in Eastern Europe were providing cash, arms, and military training to the 
MPLA, FRELIMO, and PAIGC.  
As Soviet official support for the anti-colonial movements picked up in the mid-1960s, 
the media followed suit. The 1960s saw an exposition of publications on the anti-colonial 
struggle – in print, on radio, and on television. Soviet journalists and party cadres used the print 
media to condemn the Portuguese colonialism. They also championed the anti-colonial cause 
by reporting on armed struggles in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. Soviet journalists 
also served as informal go-betweens, reporting on what they saw and briefing the party cadres 
on the situation on the ground. While print media were a fundamental feature of Soviet support 
for liberation movements, we know very little about the content – or the people behind them.8 
Characteristically, Artur Domoslawski’s biography of Ryszard Kapuscinski, a prominent Polish 
journalist and the author of such acclaimed books as The Emperor, Shah of Shahs, and Another 
Day of Life, produced much controversy when it was revealed that the former practiced a 




demystifying the role of international journalists, we can better understand the nature of Soviet 
support for anti-colonial movements and uncover the transnational networks that sustained 
them. 
This chapter investigates the functions of Soviet publications on the anti-colonial 
movements and the people behind them. It investigates the content of publications, written by a 
small team of Soviet officials who staffed the Africa desk of the CC CPSU International 
Department. It then looks at the Soviet international journalists reporting from the so-called 
liberated areas of Angola and Mozambique for Pravda, an official daily newspaper of the CPSU. 
Furthermore, this chapter uncovers the informal functions of Soviet journalists as sources of 
intelligences and informal liaisons between African and Soviet leaders. The varied functions of 
Soviet journalists are illustrated through an investigation into the career of Oleg 
Konstantinovich Ignat’ev, a Soviet international journalist (zhurnalist-mezhdunarodnik) and 
one of the most prolific commentators on the Portuguese colonies. By focusing on the content 
of Soviet print media and the people behind it, this chapter seeks to expand our understanding 
of the transnational networks that sustained the liberational struggles in Southern Africa.  
 
The liberation struggle in Southern Africa through the lens of the CC CPSU International 
Department 
The men and women who carried out Khrushchev’s new policy in the Third World were 
mostly members of the Soviet bureaucratic elite—party cadres, diplomats, spies, journalists, and 
academics. However, perhaps the most important department to deal with liberation movements 
in Southern Africa was the International Department of the CC CPSU. In response to Soviet 
interest in sub-Saharan Africa, in the early 1960s, the International Department expanded its 
Africa desk, which would come to fulfil crucial functions in daily engagement with the 




about the situation in particular areas and made policy recommendations to the head of the 
International Department, Boris Ponomarev. They also “met and greeted” African 
revolutionaries on their visits to Moscow and processed their requests for assistance.10  
In 1961, the International Department recruited Petr Nikitovich Yevsyukov as a desk 
officer responsible for Portuguese colonies. Fluent in Portuguese, Yevsyukov soon enough 
became one of the most informed figures on matters related to the Portuguese colonies as he 
received and processed all information from Soviet embassies abroad, press agencies, and 
intelligence sources. As such, he became a man with considerable influence on policy matters 
related to the Portuguese colonies.11 While we know now quite a bit about the role of Yevsyukov 
and other middle-ranking officials as important liaisons, we know very little about them as 
producers of print content, as informers and shapers of public opinion through specialized print 
media. In fact, officials like Yevsyukov were actively involved in producing content for the 
media, including for specialized journals on topics of their specialisation. 
One such journal was Aziya i Afrika Segodnya (Africa and Asia Today). Established as 
a joint publication of the Moscow-based Institute of African Studies and the Oriental Institute, 
Aziya i Afrika Segodnya became a forum for Soviet academics, international journalists, writers, 
and politicians to inform and educate the Soviet public. In general, the journal mainly targeted 
a domestic audience. Similar to other journals in the era of Khrushchev’s thaw, Aziya i Afrika 
Segodnya allowed for a measure of engagement with the readers. The journal ran a special rubric 
titled “Answers to Readers” in which the editors provided an answer to a particular question 
raised by a particular member of the public. It is not clear how many such letters were received 
by Aziya i Afrika Segodnya, but it is instructive that the editors tried to connect with the readers 
– in line with the spirit of Khrushchev’s thaw that offered greater freedom for journalists and 
editors.12 The cadres of the CC CPSU International Department and its Africa desk were regular 




Yevsyukov started to contribute to Aziya i Afrika Segodnya soon after joining the Africa desk 
at the CC CPSU International Department. One of his first articles for Aziya i Afrika Segodnya 
in August 1962 focused on the PAIGC and the anti-colonial struggle in Guinea-Bissau. In 
“Vosstaniye Razgoraetsya” [The Uprising Flares Up], Yevsyukov presented the PAIGC as the 
only organization that represented the nationalist movement in Guinea-Bissau. He emphasised 
that the PAIGC had failed to achieve independence for Guinea-Bissau by peaceful means and 
had thus launched sabotage action against the Portuguese. Yevsykov also highlighted PAIGC’s 
connections with “progressive nationalist organizations such as the MPLA” that were bound 
together in the CONCP.  He praised the PAIGC leader Amílcar Cabral as “an energetic and 
capable political leader”, who was elected “deputy Secretary General of the CONCP”.13 
Yevsyukov’s positive evaluation of Cabral on the pages of Aziya i Afrika Segodnya is not 
surprising. He had first met Cabral earlier that year, in 1962. He was immediately taken by 
Cabral’s charm and became an important chain in Cabral’s transnational support network, 
which included supporters in Ghana, Algeria, Morocco, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, and the Nordic 
countries, to name a few. Cabral and Yevsyukov would regularly meet in Moscow and 
Conakry, Guinea, where the PAIGC was based.14 
Yevsyukov continued to emphasize transnational connections between the anti-colonial 
movements. In his article dedicated to the launch of armed struggle in Mozambique in 1964, he 
again emphasized that FRELIMO was part of CONCP and wanted to unite forces with other 
liberation movements to coordinate actions against Salazar’s regime. However, this time, 
Yevsyukov spared the reader laudatory epithets regarding FRELIMO’s leadership. The reason 
for this was a complicated relationship between the Soviets and FRELIMO’s first president 
Eduardo Mondlane, who was treated with suspicion in Moscow because of his background (he 
was educated and married in the US) and his contacts with the administration of US President 




Besides shaping dominant narratives about the anti-colonial struggles, Yevsykov used 
Aziya i Afrika Segodnya to inform readers about the struggles for continued white minority rule 
in Southern Africa. In a detailed commentary about Portugal’s colonial wars in 1965, 
Yevsyukov shared the dynamics of struggle for white rule in Southern Africa. Portugal was not 
alone in the region, he argued, for it received support from South Africa’s Prime Minister 
Hendrik Verwoerd and Roy Welensky, the prime minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland. Salazar, Verwoerd, and Welensky, argued Yevsyukov, had entered into a "secret 
union" to sustain white power. Yevsyukov’s allegations were not without foundation. That 
South Africa, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and Portugal consulted and 
coordinated their actions was known. While there was probably no official "secret agreement" 
in the early 1960s, there indeed existed diplomatic, intelligence, and military exchanges between 
South Africa, Portugal, and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. By the early 1970s, these 
developed into a more formal military alliance, known as Exercise ALCORA.16 Yevsyukov also 
lashed out at the United States for playing a "double game" by supporting Salazar’s regime and 
at the same time giving money to "pro-American Angolan nationalists." 17   
Here, Yevsyukov hinted at the MPLA’s main rival—the National Front for the 
Liberation of Angola (FNLA) led by Holden Roberto. Originally established in 1958, the FNLA 
was rooted in the rooted in the Bakongo community who had traditionally traversed northern 
Angola and southwestern Congo.18 In contrast to the leftist leadership of the MPLA, Holden 
Roberto was explicitly anti-communist and looked up to the USA as a model for the future of 
Angola. He made a few trips to the USA to look for assistance, and established a covert 
relationship with the CIA. In the early 1960s, the Soviets supported the idea of a common front 
between the MPLA and the FNLA, and it is thus not surprising that Yevsyukov avoided directly 
“naming and shaming” Holden Roberto. As the Soviets abandoned the goal by the end of 1964, 




Another regular commentator on Southern Africa for Aziya i Afrika Segodnya was Petr 
Manchkha, the head of the Afrika desk at the CC CPSU International Department. Like 
Yevsyukov, Manchkha was not an expert on the Portuguese colonies. He was first brought into 
the CC CPSU International Department to maintain relationships with left-wing groups in 
Albania and Greece. After Soviet relations with Albania deteriorated in the early 1960s, he was 
moved to head the new Africa desk at the International Department.20 In early 1967, Manchkha 
took part in an intra-governmental delegation of Soviet officials who went to investigate the 
progress of armed struggle in Portuguese colonies ‘on the ground’. The delegation never crossed 
the border into the Portuguese colonies, but held a number of talks with leaders of the liberation 
movements, based in Tanzania, Zambia and Congo-Brazzaville. One of their interlocutors was 
Agostinho Neto, the MPLA’s president since 1962. The delegation came back convinced there 
was some progress and increased support for the MPLA.21  
Upon his return, Manchkha wrote a long article on his experiences for Aziya i Afrika 
Segodnya. His main goal was to convince readers that the MPLA was the “main and leading 
force” in the liberation struggle, in contrast to the FNLA led by Holden Roberto. While the 
MPLA was “the most influential and authoritative organisation in the country”, the FNLA was 
constructed on a “narrow, tribal basis” and, he said, flirted with anti-white racism. The MPLA 
tried to establish a common front with the FNLA, but Holden Roberto countered any such 
attempts, thus dividing the nationalist movement. Behind the FNLA’s divisive tactics, argued 
Manchkha, was the United States, which supported Holden Roberto to lay the groundwork for 
influence in case Angola became independent. As such, Manchkha reinforced the MPLA’s 
narrative of being the only organisation that represented the people of Angola and of Holden 
Roberto as a puppet of the United States.22 Manchkha also highlighted the key role of the Soviet 
Union in supporting the liberation movements: “Active and regular support that the Soviet 




freedom and national independence proof of the truly internationalist attitudes of the Soviet 
people towards national-liberation movement of oppressed peoples.”23 
As such, Aziya i Afrika Segodnya served to inform and educate Soviet citizens. Articles 
by Yevsyukov and Manchkha sought to construct narratives of the MPLA, FRELIMO, and 
PAIGC as the only viable representatives of their own people and to bash their internal rivals. 
They also sought to condemn the United States and the West for supporting white minority rule 
in Southern Africa, while highlighting Soviet support for anti-colonial struggles. This was to 
highlight Soviet internationalism in the service of anti-colonialism, as opposed to Western 
hypocrisy and moral duplicity. These publications in Aziya i Afrika Segodnya thus also served 
as an important “moral weapon” in the struggle for “hearts and minds” for domestic and 
international audiences in the context of the Cold War. The journal also provided a platform for 
Africans themselves to communicate with the Soviet readership. Among regular contributors 
were Amílcar Cabral and Agostinho Neto, who regularly published updates on the progress of 
armed struggle.24 Meant to educate and inform, the articles published by party cadres such as 
Yevsyukov and Manchkha were generally quite similar in the language used and the messages 
conveyed. These contrasted sharply with the lively style of so-called “reports from liberated 
areas” that became a common feature of Soviet print media, starting from the mid-1960s.  
 
Soviet Journalist and Reports from the Liberated Areas 
In the socialist countries, foreign journalists were a privileged caste. Soviet international 
journalists could travel and work abroad, a marker of privilege bestowed upon a narrow elite. 
The route to such a privileged career often started with passing difficult entrance exams to enrol 
at the Moscow State University or the Moscow State University of International Relations 
(MGIMO), which offered training in area studies and foreign languages. The vast majority of 




requirements restricted access to women and men of Jewish ethnic background.25 Soviet 
international journalists were highly educated men who spoke foreign languages. Many had 
fought in the Second World War. These Soviet journalists were part of a confident post-war 
generation who were proud of their country and its achievements, and were dedicated to the 
party. Many were ‘true believers’ in Soviet socialism and welcomed Khrushchev’s speech at 
the Twentieth Congress. When Khrushchev turned to the Third World, Soviet journalists were 
also to act as informal ambassadors to the Third World, to enhance the positive image of the 
Soviet Union – in print and in person. As to the Soviet elite in general, the anti-colonial and 
revolutionary struggles excited journalists, who saw the Third World as the new frontier, where 
revolution could be reborn. It is not surprising that Soviet journalists jumped on the bandwagon 
to report on anti-colonial struggles. Starting from the mid-1960s, Soviet journalists would 
commonly report about their travels to areas where the anti-colonial movements were heavily 
present, the so-called liberated areas.26 
The emergence of Soviet reporting from the liberated areas also coincided with the 
intensification of armed struggle in Portuguese colonies. In 1964, MPLA reorganized its 
operations from a new base in Congo-Brazzaville. Armed with Soviet weapons and backed by 
a contingent of Cuban advisers, the organisation started operations in Cabinda – an Angolan 
enclave in neighbouring Congo-Brazzaville. As the MPLA launched its first forays into Cabinda 
in 1965, Soviet journalists began touring areas of Angola under control of the MPLA, known as 
“liberated areas”. Mikhail Domogatskikh was the first Soviet journalist to travel to Cabinda, 
accompanied by the MPLA guerrillas. He came back with field notes that were published in a 
series of articles in Pravda under the title “Plamya nad Angoloy” [Flame over Angola] between 
May and June 1965.  
Such reports were made for domestic and international consumption. They would be first 




audiences. Finally, they would be recorded and scrutinized by PIDE, Portugal’s secret police. 
In one of the first reports in “Flame over Angola”, Domogatskikh described his ardours journey, 
crossing the border, and finally meeting the MPLA guerrillas, “valiant fighters for the freedom 
of Angola”. Upon arrival, he discovered a sense of comradery and a genuine interest in Soviet 
experience of struggle against fascism during the Second World War.27 In subsequent articles 
for Pravda, Domogatskikh goes on to depict the portraits of specific guerrilla commanders: their 
backgrounds, the reasons for joining the struggle, and hopes for the future. Domogatskikh also 
relays the words of an MPLA guerrilla commander about difficulties in their struggle and about 
those who, like Holden Roberto, have betrayed the revolution. His articles are filled with 
emotion, he wants to convince the reader about the sincerity of their fighters and their sacrifice.28 
He finishes the series of articles with a celebration of the Soviet solidarity with the MPLA, with 
highlighting ties that bind: 
 I started talking about how much our people are paying attention to the national 
liberation struggle, how much they are following the wars in Angola, Mozambique, and 
‘Portuguese’ Guinea: ‘The Soviet Union has always been and will remain with you, dear 
comrades.’ Everybody jumped from seats. Hands clutching machine guns went up: 
‘Vive Union Soviétique! Vive Moscou!’29 
Tomas Kolesnichenko followed Domogatskikh to Angola shortly afterwards. 
Kolesnichenko was one of Pravda’s main foreign correspondents, known for his lively writing 
style and flair for adventure. In early 1966, Kolesnichenko published a full account of his travels 
in Angola for Pravda in a series of articles titled “Pis’ma iz Angoly” [Letters from Angola]. In 
his first ‘letter’ for Pravda, Kolesnichenko constructed a portrait of the MPLA’s President 
Agostinho Neto as a hero of the liberation struggle. Kolesnichenko showed himself dining with 
Agostinho Neto before crossing the border. Then, their conversation was interrupted by 




loud speech. The partisans listen for some time, then they start laughing. ‘This is Portuguese 
radio’, says Agostinho Neto’. Now they are saying that they had completely crushed the bandits, 
while only few ‘agents from Moscow’ remain. Meanwhile, the existence of Angolan partisans 
is a myth, made up by the agitators".30 Kolesnichenko’s goal was to counter Portuguese 
propaganda, to show that the MPLA was "real" and that it indeed controlled areas under its 
occupation. Kolesnichenko relays a conversation with Hoji Ya Henda, a popular MPLA 
guerrilla commander. The Portuguese propaganda was a lie, according to Hoji Ya Henda. The 
MPLA’s forces were regularly engaged in fighting the Portuguese, who rarely ventured out of 
their posts for fear of ambushes.31  
Once Kolesnichenko crossed the border into Angola, his gaze turned towards the MPLA 
guerrillas and the nature of the struggle. In the midst of the jungle, he sees the portrait of I. V. 
Lenin. The Angolan partisans “know Lenin”. Kolesnichenko describes MPLA guerrillas as 
“internationalists, convinced their task was inexorably linked with the struggle against 
imperialism and colonialism.”32 The role of Holden Roberto and FNLA also comes up in 
Kolesnichenko’s account. He highlights FNLA’s duplicitous nature through a story of Veneno 
(nom de guerre), another MPLA commander. Veneno was the son of a poor plantation worker 
who had been abused by his boss.33 Since childhood, Veneno hated colonial rule and thus he 
did not hesitate to join the uprising in 1961. Veneno first joined the FNLA, but he was soon 
disappointed when he realised that Holden Roberto did not fight against the colonizers, but only 
enriched himself. After many travails, he managed to escape and finally joined MPLA.34 In 
another article for Pravda, Kolesnichenko goes further to portray MPLA as a beacon of hope 
for Africa. He underlines that Bourgeoisie propaganda” was wrong to celebrate the destruction 
of the “progressive forces”. In fact, MPLA’s struggle showed that forces existed in Africa that 
would develop revolution. That, he continued, depended on support from the Soviet Union and 




movement against colonialism and imperialism can’t exist in isolation from the international 
workers' movement, from the international socialist system.”35 
In reports from the liberated areas, journalists like Domogatskikh and Kolesnichenko 
constructed a dominant narrative for MPLA and its struggle. The MPLA enjoyed widespread 
control and a large degree of control in rural areas. They were the only representative of the 
liberation struggle in Angola, juxtaposed with Holden Roberto’s FNLA who were ineffective 
and unwilling to fight. Another aim was to reaffirm Soviet leadership of the international 
communist movement. In fact, as the journalists tried to show, MPLA’s struggle could not exist 
in isolation, without Soviet support. MPLA’s struggle proved that revolution was alive and the 
Soviet Union was crucial to its success. Over time, Soviet journalists reporting from liberated 
areas of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau became fairly commonplace. They often 
went with small crews of cameramen to shoot films about the armed struggle. They also came 
back with reports of the "real situation on the ground" for official use. Nobody exemplified the 
many functions Soviet journalists played in the struggle for liberation in Southern Africa than 
Oleg Ignat’ev.  
 
The Myth-Maker? Oleg Ignat’ev and the Struggle against Portuguese Colonial Rule 
Ignat’ev’s career reflects the multiplicity of roles that were accessible to highly sought-
after area studies specialists with the knowledge of foreign languages. Born in 1924, Ignat’ev served 
in the Black Sea fleet during the Second World War as a deep-water diver who laid mines. After 
the war, he enrolled in the prestigious Moscow State University of International Relations 
(MGIMO). After graduating in 1949, he first worked for Komsomolskaya Pravda before going on 
a three-year foreign assignment to Argentina where he worked as the second secretary and press 
attaché at the Soviet Embassy. Back in Moscow, he moved to a post at the State Committee for 




Komsomolskaya Pravda. In 1964, Ignat’ev started working for Pravda.36 It was shortly after he 
started to work for Pravda that he met Amílcar Cabral. He remembered that their first meeting took 
place on 10 November 1965 in Moscow at the initiative of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity 
Committee. “A mulatto of medium height entered the mention at Kropotkinskaya Street. He had 
regular features and his brown eyes looked calmly and attentively from behind large, horn-rimmed 
glasses. His temples had begun to grey. On his head was a knitted cap work by Czech skiers. 
'Amílcar Cabral', he introduced himself and held out his hand”. It was at that meeting that Cabral 
first suggested that Soviet journalists should venture to the "liberated areas" of Guinea-Bissau. 
Apparently, Ignat’ev immediately supported Cabral’s idea and suggested that Pravda should 
dispatch him to report on the situation there.37  
In 1966, Ignat’ev became the first Soviet journalist to travel to Guinea-Bissau. On his first 
trip, he went to the south of Guinea-Bissau – the heartland of support for PAIGC. On first 
examination, Ignat’ev’s reports on liberated areas in Guinea-Bissau differ little from those of Tom 
Kolesnichenko or Mikhail Domogatskikh. He wrote about the cruelty of Portuguese colonialism 
and PAIGC’s brave struggle, all against the backdrop of his own trek across the Guinea/Guinea-
Bissau border into the liberated areas, night-time bombardments, and conversations about freedom 
with the guerrillas. However, Ignat’ev went further.38 In his reports, he showed PAIGC acting as 
an "embryo state" in the liberated areas by building schools for children and offering primary 
healthcare services for the people. Ignat’ev also zoomed in on Soviet solidarity with the struggle, 
mainly through reporting on meetings with those who had studied in the Soviet Union. During his 
first trip to Guinea-Bissau, Ignat’ev talks about meeting a young woman who had just returned from 
the USSR, where she had studied to become a nurse. In his last report from Guinea-Bissau, Ignat’ev 
reports, he finally met Amílcar Cabral, who asked him to speak about what he saw in front of the 
UN’s Decolonisation Committee. Ignat’ev could not go testify, but stressed his reports bore witness 




leadership of PAIGC; that there was no colonial administration in the liberated areas; and that the 
struggle for liberation was led by regular military units of the PAIGC’s armed forces.39 Overall, 
Ignat’ev’s reports meant to reinforce the dominant narrative of PAIGC as an "embryo state" in the 
liberated areas for domestic and international audiences.  
After his first trip in 1966, Ignat’ev became a regular visitor to Guinea-Bissau. In 1968, he 
went to Guinea-Bissau again, this time with a crew of Soviet cameramen to shoot a film about 
PAIGC. In 1970, he covered the armed struggle in the East of Guinea-Bissau. Ignat’ev’s interest in 
Guinea-Bissau was shaped by a close personal relationship that he developed with Amílcar Cabral. 
In the early 1970s, Cabral’s daughter, Iva, stayed at Ignat’ev’s home as a first-year student at the 
History Department of the Moscow State University. Cabral thus commonly met Ignat’ev in his 
home, discussing forthcoming trips. The two became friends. In 1973, Ignat’ev went to Guinea-
Bissau again. This time, he wanted to cross the whole country from north to south. On 21 January 
1973, Ignat’ev was in Mores in the north of Guinea-Bissau when he heard news of Cabral’s 
assassination in Conakry.40  Cabral was murdered as part of a failed plot, concocted by the 
Portuguese and executed by a group of PAIGC members, unhappy with the progress of armed 
struggle and with what they believed was the dominant position of Cape Verdeans in the PAIGC. 
The Soviets were very worried about PAIGC’s prospects in the aftermath of Cabral’s death. With 
Cabral gone, the Soviet military felt the PAIGC was under threat of being subsumed by either the 
Guineans, the Cubans, or both, so they dramatically expanded military assistance.41 Since Ignat’ev 
happened to be inside Guinea-Bissau when Cabral’s murder took place, he had the privileged 
position to structure the narrative.  
One of his aims was to underscore that Cabral’s murder did not change the situation inside 
the country, that PAIGC still had the support of the local population. The main reason why common 
people in the liberated areas supported PAIGC, argued Ignat’ev in characteristic fashion, was the 




recounted a conversation with Fode Ture, “an elder of about seventy years old, dressed in typical 
Muslim dress”. According to Ture, people did not know anything beyond their own village. Now, 
Ture’s elder son was fighting for PAIGC in the south, while one of his granddaughters was studying 
abroad to become a teacher. PAIGC built schools and dispatched doctors to care for children. The 
Portuguese may have killed Cabral, but the people would never live in the same way as before.42 
Another of Ignat’ev’s aims was to dispel the notion that the coup in Conakry and Cabral’s 
murder had anything to do with disagreements within the party. Returning to Conakry from his tour 
of Guinea-Bissau in February 1973, Ignat’ev was the first international journalist to interview 
Cabral’s wife Anna Maria, the only eye-witness to the assassination. The short version of her 
account was printed in Pravda on 6 March 1973. In an emotional account, Ignat’ev relayed Anna 
Maria’s account of the murder: Cabral’s bravery in dealing with his assassins, reinforcing his image 
as a slain revolutionary hero. In his own commentary, Ignat’ev emphasised that Cabral’s assassins 
were mere criminals who worked for the Portuguese.43 As such, Ignat’ev’s reports were supposed 
to reassure about PAIGC's success and provide credence to the organization in crisis. He developed 
the narrative in a book-length study of Cabral’s murder, published in 1975 and 1976, in Portuguese 
and Russian. Written in a lively journalistic style, the book is based on minutes of interrogations 
with those who were involved in the plot to murder Cabral and aimed to show PIDE as the main 
villains.44 
In the following years, Ignat’ev continued to write to establish the "myth of Amílcar 
Cabral”. In 1975, he published the first biography of Cabral, titled Amílcar Cabral: The Son of 
Africa both in Russian and Portuguese.45 The book does not have any references, but does contain 
verbatim dialogues with Cabral and others around him to paint an idealistic picture of a man fully 
dedicated to the struggle from a young age. Ignat’ev’s Cabral is an ideal type, a hero of a liberation 
struggle. Allegedly based on Ignat’ev’s conversations with Cabral during his many tours of the 




uncompromising leader and fighter for independence of his nation. However, the book remained 
the only biography of Cabral until the publication of Patrick Chabal’s Amílcar Cabral: 
Revolutionary Leadership and People's War.46 As Chabal is right to note, the biography was 
“tendentious journalistic of arbitrary chosen events in Cabral’s life”.47 Ignat’ev’s biography of 
Cabral was never meant to be an academic study. Written in a vivid and racy style, it was supposed 
to enchant the reader, to construct his image as a revolutionary hero akin to Che Guevara. 
“Ignat’ev’s work is truly worthy of a film script”, writes Mustafa Dhada.48 While Ignat’ev spent a 
lot of time and energy writing on PAIGC, by the early 1970s, he had become the main journalist 
reporting on struggles in southern Africa—in Angola and Mozambique.  
Upon the request of MPLA’s Agostinho Neto, in July 1970, Ignat’ev headed a four-men 
Soviet crew on a trip to Angola. Their goal was to shoot a film about life in MPLA-controlled 
liberated areas. Ignat’ev’s reports from Angola were very similar to those from Guinea-Bissau, 
characterized by similar romanticism and dominant narratives of suffering and struggle against 
Portuguese colonialism. As in his reports from Guinea-Bissau, Ignat’ev pays a lot of attention to 
MPLA’s attempt to establish an "embryo state" in Angola: “The women work in the fields, the men 
go hunting and fishing, they engage in cattle grazing and extract honey. Seemingly, this is the quiet, 
patriarchal life, which has been in place for centuries. You will immediately notice the changes in 
people’s lives that occurred due to selfless work of the MPLA”. Ignat’ev elaborates: the MPLA had 
opened schools and healthcare services. The local medic, Bazadio, studied medicine in the USSR. 
Attached to the article were photographs of the partisans, but also of small children sitting behind 
desks.49 He also notes the evolution of MPLA’s armed struggle: the organization was waging the 
war in all areas of Angola; the headquarters had been moved inside of the country. There were many 
more trained cadres who had undergone military training in “North Africa and the socialist 
countries, including in the USSR”.50 A year later, in July-August 1971, Ignat’ev went to southern 




Ignat’ev’s trip to Mozambique in 1971 coincided with a difficult period of anti-colonial 
struggle in the Portuguese colonies. In 1970, the Portuguese undertook a massive counter-offensive 
in Angola and Mozambique. In Angola, it was led by an experienced general, Francisco da Costa 
Gomes. In Mozambique, General Kaúlza de Arriaga launched Operação Nó Górdio (Operation 
Gordian Knot), a massive military offensive against FRELIMO. While Gordian Knot was originally 
successful, by 1971, it had become clear that FRELIMO had shifted the focus of its operations from 
the northern Cabo Delgado to Tete Province.51 At the same time, the Soviets were reviewing their 
support for FRELIMO. In 1967–69, FRELIMO had undergone an internal crisis, which led to the 
rise of Samora Machel as the new president after Eduardo Mondlane’s assassination. Machel was 
suspicious of the Soviets, but he was nonetheless eager to obtain increased assistance to counter the 
Portuguese offensive and expand operations. Machel first came to Moscow 1971. The occasion was 
the Twenty-Fourth Congress of the CPSU, but Machel’s main goal was to negotiate with the Soviet 
Military for the delivery of new weapons.52 The Soviets remained cautious about FRELIMO and 
eager to investigate their political alignment, especially with the Chinese.53  
The purpose of the trip to Mozambique was thus two-fold. As before, Soviet journalists 
were to establish the dominant narratives of FRELIMO’s liberation struggle. In his reports for 
Pravda, Ignat’ev covered familiar themes: the brutality of Portuguese colonial wars, the bravery of 
the guerrilla fighters, and FRELIMO’s modernisation attempts in rural areas. While the deliveries 
of Soviet arms were always an open secret, it was not until 1970 that Moscow decided to openly 
admit they were providing arms to the anti-colonial movements.54 Now, Ignat’ev openly wrote 
about Soviet military assistance to the anti-colonial movements.55 However, Ignat’ev and his crew 
were also to produce a secret report about the situation on the ground to ascertain the progress of 
armed struggle and the moods of FRELIMO’s leadership. The journalists’ secret report to the CC 
CPSU from 7 August 1971 on the situation inside FRELIMO was quite positive. They wrote 




and wilful leader” who was quite impressed by the conversations he had had in Moscow during the 
Twenty-Fourth Congress of the CPSU. Machel was still in the process of "political formation", they 
continued, but his background, having come from a “very poor peasant family”, set him on a path 
to become a "true people’s leader".56 While one could still see China’s influence among FRELIMO, 
they argued, the organisation had turned in the direction of the USSR. To enhance the trend, 
Moscow should step up assistance and widen contacts with the leadership. Another way of 
countering Chinese influence would be through the "political education" of FRELIMO cadres 
coming to study in the USSR.57 It is not clear how much these kinds of recommendations affected 
Soviet attitudes and policies towards FRELIMO. However, they prove that journalists like Ignat’ev 
fulfilled multiple functions, especially when truthful information was pretty scarce. 
On 25 April 1975, a group of junior military officers known as the Armed Forces 
Movement (MFA) seized power in Portugal. The coup led to a process of democratization, known 
as the Carnation Revolution. Censorship was lifted, political parties legalized, and the secret police 
disbanded. Among those who were allowed to return to Portugal in the aftermath of the coup were 
Álvaro Cunhal and Mário Soares, the General Secretaries of the Portuguese Communist Party and 
the Socialist Party, respectively. Both were invited to join the first provisional government, with 
Soares taking an important portfolio as the foreign minister. Soares proceeded to negotiate for 
transfers of power to PAIGC and FRELIMO in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. Angola was a 
much more complicated case. The coup in Lisbon took the Soviets by surprise. In Angola, the 
nationalist movement was divided between three rival organisations: MPLA, FNLA, and the 
National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), led by Jonas Savimbi. In a series of 
meeting at Alvor, Portugal, in January 1975, the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA signed an agreement, 
which obligated all three to share power in a transitional government and to hold constituent 




the Alvor Accord did not hold. By June 1975, the country was engulfed by a civil war, with MPLA 
pitted against FNLA and UNITA. 
The Soviets also had very little information about developments on the ground. In fact, 
they had very little impact upon the process of negotiations for transfer of power to PAIGC and 
FRELIMO, which were ongoing for most of the summer of 1974. The Soviets needed to understand 
the balance of forces on the ground. In September 1974, Oleg Ignat’ev became the first Soviet 
journalist to make a long trip to Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola. He returned with a series 
of economic and political recommendations for the CC CPSU. His evaluation of the situation in 
Guinea-Bissau was particularly positive. In his report to the CC CPSU, he argued Guinea-Bissau 
might well soon turn into an “example for many Third World countries” since PAIGC had many 
experienced, talented leaders, many of whom had been educated in the USSR. He also observed the 
development of a bitter rivalry between liberation movements in Angola and advised that the 
Soviets should step up support for MPLA. In a handwritten comment, the head of the CC CPSU 
Africa desk Petr Manchkha stated that the Soviet Solidarity Committee and other Soviet "public 
organizations" would consider his report.58  
Ignat’ev was not the only Soviet journalist to provide "first-hand" information on 
developments in Angola. In December, Mikhail Zenovich, a journalist with Pravda, followed 
Ignat’ev to evaluate the situation in Luanda. In his report to the SovietForeign Ministry, Zenovich 
noted the intensification of rivalries between key political parties in the capital. The future power 
in Angola depended on whether MPLA or its main rival, FNLA, backed by Zaire, could accumulate 
sufficient military force.59 These observations together with information coming from other MPLA 
leadership seemed to confirm to the Soviets the need to resume military support for MPLA by the 
end of 1974.60 However, Ignat’ev still remained the key Soviet journalist reporting on Angola. In 
the months preceding the declaration of independence on 11 November, Ignat’ev was back in 




who had first arrived in Angola in early 1975, working undercover as a TASS correspondent. 
Another journalist who often travelled with Ignat’ev and Uvarov was Ryszard Kapuscinski, the 
Polish journalist and author of Another Day of Life. In the months preceding the declaration of 
independence, Ignat’ev and Uvarov served as key liaisons between Moscow and MPLA leadership, 
relaying messages from the Soviet government. When Oleg Nazhestkin, a KGB officer who had 
known Agostinho Neto since the early 1960s, arrived in besieged Luanda in early November, he 
recalled meeting Ignat’ev and Uvarov in the famous Tivoli Hotel. Late at night, all three men drove 
to Neto’s residence to pass on a note of support from the Soviet government.61  
Alongside Uvarov, Ignat’ev became a key source of information about developments on 
the ground, while simultaneously writing many short reports for Pravda. Later, he published a book 
based on his notes and memories from his time in Angola titled Operatziya Kobra-75 (Operation 
Cobra-75).62 While Ignat’ev’s and Kapuscinski were in Luanda at the same time, the two books are 
very different. Kapuscinski’s Another Day of Life is an evocation of Luanda as a wooden city 
floating away, as he witnesses the Portuguese evacuation amid the civil war. In Another Day of Life, 
Kapuscinski is firmly on the side of the MPLA and even picks up a gun in real life in the midst of 
the fighting.63 Both Kapuscinski and Ignat’ev portray the MPLA in heroic terms. However, if 
Kapuscinski is interested in the spirit of the times, the Zeitgeist, Ignat’ev wants to prove events in 
Angola as a product of international conspiracy, concocted by the USA, China, and South Africa. 
He describes in grimy details the brutality of the FNLA and UNITA, but accords either organisation 
little agency, arguing there was no secret that the “mobs of Savimbi and Roberto” played a 
secondary role in the intervention.64 Published in 1978, in the midst of the Soviet-Cuban operation 
in Angola, Ignat’ev also openly speaks about Cuban advisors, but does not mention about the role 





The print media were crucial to Soviet engagement with the anti-colonial struggles in 
southern Africa. Writings on the anti-colonial movements, however similar in their message, 
writing style, and means, were fundamental to expressing Soviet solidarity with anti-colonial 
movements. They were meant to educate and inform domestic and international audiences and 
help the chosen anti-colonial movements—MPLA, FRELIMO, and PAIGC—construct heroic 
metanarratives of anti-colonial struggle. As this chapter shows, not only professional journalists, 
but also party cadres like Yevsyukov and Manckha, were involved in the process of constructing 
the dominant narrative of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. The journalists’ accounts 
"from the liberated areas” were, however, quite different since they were intended to evoke 
emotions of solidarity in the readers and affinity with the guerrilla fighters. Besides establishing 
the dominant narrative of anti-colonial struggles, the key goal of these reports from liberated 
areas was to validate the socialist experiment and increase the prestige of the Soviet Union. 
Through these romanticised descriptions of the anti-colonial struggles in southern Africa, Soviet 
journalists tried to build an "imagined community", bound together by common vision of the 
future. 
Oleg Ignat’ev embodied the many functions of a Soviet internationalist journalist. 
Through his reports, he established a particular language and narratives to talk about liberation 
in Southern Africa. He emphasised personal bravery and sacrifice of the African guerrillas, as 
well as the cruelty of Portuguese colonialism, backed by the US and other Western allies. 
Besides, Ignat’ev consistently underscored the liberation movements as sources of 
modernisation in the liberated areas. Like other journalists, Igant’ev also served as an informal 
go-between for the leadership of the liberation movements and Soviet officials, providing first-
hand information about developments on the ground. Soviet journalists like Ignat’ev were key 
to establishing the heroic narratives of anti-colonial struggle, which revolved around Africa’s 








1 M. Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of 
the Post-Cold War Era, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
2 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 
London: Verso, 1991. 
3 J. Brennan, “Radio Cairo and the Decolonization of Africa, 1953–1964”, in: C. Lee (ed.), 
Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Movement and Its Political Afterlives, Athens: 
Ohio U.P., 2010. 
4 This meeting also included: The Committee for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe 
(CLSTP); the Union of Angola’s Workers (UNTA); the Goan National Congress; Goa 
Liberation Council; Goan People’s Party; and the Goan League. See: José Manuel Duarte de 
Jesus, Casablanca: o Início do Isolamento Português, Lisboa: Gradiva, 2006, pp. 59-69. 
5. J. Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of an Explosion, 1950–1962, 2 vols., 
Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969, pp. 10–11. 
6. M. Laban, Mário Pinto de Andrade: Uma Entrevista dada a Michel Laban [Mário Pinto De 
Andrade: An Interview Given to Michel Laban], M. A. Daskalos (trans.), Lisboa: Edições João 
Sá da Costa, 1997, p. 167. 
7 S. Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev: Creation of a Superpower, University Park: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 2000, p. 436; M. Roman, Opposing Jim Crow: African Americans and 
the Soviet Indictment of U.S. Racism, 1928–1937, Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska 
Press, 2012, pp. 1–2; S. Mazov, A Distant Front in the Cold War: The USSR in West Africa 
and the Congo, 1956–1964, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010. 
8 One exception is work by Mary Catharine French who underlines the importance of Soviet 
internationalist journalists in attempts to improve Soviet image in the Third World. See: M. 
C. French, “Reporting Socialism: Soviet Journalism and the Journalists' Union, 1955-1966”, 
PhD thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 2014. 
9 A. Domoslawski, Ryszard Kapuscinski: A Life, A. Lloyd-Jones (trans.), London: Verso, 2012. 




                                                                                                                                                                                    
10 N. Telepneva, “Mediators of Liberation: Eastern-Bloc Officials, Mozambican Diplomacy 
and the Origins of Soviet Support for Frelimo, 1958–1965”, Journal of Southern African 
Studies, 43 (2017) 1, pp. 67–81. 
11 V. Shubin, The Hot Cold War: The U.S.S.R in Southern Africa, London: Pluto Press, 2008, 
p. 3 
12 S. Huxtable, “The Life and Death of Brezhnev’s Thaw: Changing Values in Soviet 
Journalism after Khrushchev, 1964–1968”, in: D. Fainberg and A. Kalinovsky (eds.), 
Reconsidering Stagnation in the Brezhnev Era: Ideology and Exchange, Lantham: Lexington 
Books, 2016, pp. 21–43. 
13 P. Yevsyukov, “Vosstaniye Razgoraetsya”, Aziya i Afrika Segodnya, 2 (1962) 8, pp. 18–19. 
14 P. Yevsyukov, "Natsionalno-osvoboditelnaya Borba v Gvinee-Bissau”, in: A. Vasil’yev 
(ed.), Afrika v Vospominaniyakh Veteranov Diplomaticheskoy Sluzhby, Moscow: Institut 
Afriki RAN, 2004, p. 140. 
15 P. Yevsyukov, “Front Osvobozhdeniya Mozambika”, Aziya i Afrika Segodnya, 8 (1965) 3, 
pp. 8–9; On Soviet relations with FRELIMO, see: Telepneva, “Mediators of Liberation”, pp. 
67–81. 
16 F. R. de Meneses and R. McNamara, “The Last Throw of the Dice: Portugal, Rhodesia and 
South Africa, 1970–1974”, Portuguese Studies, 28 (2012) 2, pp. 201–215. 
17 P. Yevsyukov, “Sorvat’ Sgovor Kolonizatorov!”, Aziya i Afrika Segodnya, 3 (1963) 1, pp. 
12–14. 
18 The FNLA was first established in 1958 under the name the Union of People’s of Angola 
(UPA; União das Populações de Angola). On the MPLA and FNLA, see: J. M. Mbah, As 
Rivalidades Políticas entre a Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) e o 
Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA (1961-1975), Luanda: Mayamba, 2010, 
pp. 46-72; J.P. N`Ganga. O Pai do Nacionalismo Angolano. As memórias de Holden Roberto 
Vol. 1. 1923-1974, São Paulo: Ed. Parma, 2008, pp. 53-58. 
19 N. Telepneva, “Our Sacred Duty: The Soviet Union, the Liberation Movements in the 
Portuguese Colonies, and the Cold War, 1961-1975”, PhD thesis, the London School of 
Economics and Political Science, 2014. 
20 V . Kirpichenko, Razvedka: Litsa i Lichnosti, Moscow: Geya, 1998, p. 205; V. Shubin, 
conversation with the author, 8 April 2015, Moscow. 
21 Shubin, Hot "Cold War”, p. 16 
22 On the MPLA’s strategy and campaign in Southeast Angola, see: I. Brinkman, Inge, A War 
for People: Civilians, Mobility, and Legitimacy in South-East Angola During MPLA’s War 




                                                                                                                                                                                    
23 P. Manchkha, “Kolonialism Obrechen. Angola Budet Svobodnoy”, Aziya I Afrika Segodny, 
11 (1967) 7, p. 29. 
24 A. Neto, “My Gotovimsya k Sokrushitelnomu udaru”, Aziya I Afrika Segodnya, 9 (1965) 12, 
p. 30; A. Cabral, “Uverennost v Pobede”, Ibid; A. Cabral, “Edinstvo Obespechit Pobedy”, 
Aziya i Afrika Segodnya, 10 (1966) 5, pp. 10–11; Interview with A. Neto, “Samoye Vazhnoye 
Oruzhie”, Aziya i Afrika Segodnya, 11 (1967) 1, pp. 30–31. 
25 N. Mitrokhin, "Elita 'Zakrytogo Obshchestva': MGIMO, Mezhdunarodnye otdely apparata 
TsK KPSS i prosopografiia ikh sotrudnikov”, Ab Imperio, 4 (2013), pp.145–86. 
26 N. Leonov, Likholetie: Sekretnye Missii, Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1995, pp. 
7-39. 
27 Pravda Correspondent’s Visit to Angolan Rebels, Moscow in Portuguese for Africa, 19,00 
GMT 28.5.65, Excerpts from broadcast account of Soviet journalist’s visit to Angola, Torre 
Tombo (Lisbon), K/4/2/7/1; M. Domogatskikh, “Plamya nad Angoloy”, Pravda, 28 May 1965, 
p. 3. 
28 M. Domogatskikh, “Plamya nad Angoloy”, Pravda, 7 June 1965, p. 3. 
29 M. Domogatskikh, “Plamya nad Angoloy”, Pravda, 16 June 1965, p. 3. 
30 T. Kolesnichenko, "Pis'ma iz Angoly: Chistaya Voda”, Pravda, 8 March 1966, p. 5. 
31 Ibid. 
32 T. Kolesnichenko, “Otryad Tovarishcha Vystrel”, 11 March 1966, p. 5. 
33 T. Kolesnichenko, Granitsu Perekhodyat v Polnoch, p. 24 
34 Ibid., pp. 30–37. 
35 T. Kolesnichenko, "Pis'ma iz Angoly: Viktoria o Moerte", Pravda, 22 April, 1966, 
p. 5; Kolesnichenko, Granitsu Perekhodyat v Polnoch, pp. 30–31 
36 Komsomolskaya Pravda, “Oleg Konstantinovich Ignat’ev”, 
https://www.kp.ru/best/msk/korrespondenty_pobedy/page19738.html (accessed 20 February 
2019). 
37 O. Ignat’ev, Amílcar Cabral: Patriot, Fighter, Humanist, Moscow: Novosti, 1990, p. 5 
38 O. Ignat’ev, “Pepel I Plamya Kafina”, Pravda, 8 June 1966, p. 7; O. Ignat’ev, “Boytsy iz 
tysyachi tabanok”, Pravda, 13 June 1966, p. 3; O. Ignat’ev, “Ukhodit na Zadanie Otryad”, 
Pravda, 17 June 1966, p. 5. 
39 O. Ignat’ev, “Chas Pobedy Prob’yet”, Pravda, 29 June 1966, p. 5. 




                                                                                                                                                                                    
41 Kulikov to CC CPSU, February 14, 1973, “On the Situation in the PAIGC”, RGANI, f. 5, 
op. 66, d. 1190; Kulikov to CC CPSU, September 28, 1973, "On the Question of the Provision 
of Aid to the PAIGC from Several Countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa", RGANI, f. 5, op. 
66, d. 1190, 213; Kulikov to CC CPSU, July 18, "On the Situation in the PAIGC", RGANI, f. 
5, op. 66, d. 1190, p. 133. 
42 O. Ignat’ev, "400 Kilometrov po Osvobozhdennym Rayonam”, Pravda, 4 March 1973, p. 4. 
43 O. Ignat’ev, "Kto Ubil Amilkara Kabrala”, Pravda, 6 March 1973, p. 4. 
44 Oleg Ignat’ev, Tri Vystrela v Rayone Min’er: Dokumental’naya Povest o A. Kabrale”, 
Moscow: Profizdat, 1976; Oleg Ignat’ev, Três tiros da PIDE: Quem, , Porquê e Como 
Mataram Amicar Cabral?, Lisbon: Prelo, 1975. 
45 O. Ignat’ev, Amilkar Kabral: Syn Afriki, Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoy literatury, 
1975; O. Ignat’ev, Amílcar Cabral: Filho de Africa, Lisbon: Prelo Editora, 1975.  
46 P. Chabal, Amílcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People's War, African Studies 
Series Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Also see: Dhada, Warriors at Work; J.S. 
Sousa, Amílcar Cabral (1924–1973) Vida e Morte de um Revolucionario Africano, 1924–1973, 
Coimbra: Edição de Autor, 2016. 
47 Chabal, Amílcar Cabral, p. 241. 
48 Dhada, Warriors at Work, p. 210. 
49 Ignat'ev, Oleg. "A Vitória é Certa: Reportage from the Angolan Partisan Detachment”, 
Pravda, 23 August 1970, p. 4 
50 Ignat'ev, Oleg. "Na Zapad ot Zambezi”, Pravda, 17 August 1970, p. 3 
51 M.D. Newitt, A History of Mozambique, London: Hurst, 1995, pp. 531–32. 
52 S. Vieira, Participei, Por Isso Testemunho, Maputo: Ndjira, 2011, pp. 598–99. 
53 Slipchenko (Dar es Salaam) to Moscow, 20 July 1973, Record of a Conversation with 
Machel, dos Santos, and Chissano, 17 July 1973, RGANI, f. 5, op. 60, d. 865. 
54 The provision of arms was first officially acknowledged by the director of the Institute of 
African Studies, Vasiliy Solodovnikov, in his address to the delegates of the International 
Conference of Solidarity with the Peoples of the Portuguese Colonies, held in Rome, in 1970. 
See: V. Solodovnikov, Tvorcheskii put' v Afrikanistiku i Diplomatiiu, Moscow: Institut Afriki 
RAN, 2000, p. 91. 
55 On Ignat’ev’s trip to Mozambique in 1971, see: O. Ignat’ev, “Den’ v Pogranichnom 
Rayone”, Pravda, 8 August 1971, p. 4; O. Ignat’ev, “Na Zemle Pelmeni Makonde”, Pravda, 




                                                                                                                                                                                    
56 Mikhalev, Nikanorov, Shchashchaev (Lusaka) to Moscow, “Report on the Trip of 
Journalists and Cameramen in Semi-liberated Regions of Tete in Mozambique”, 7 August 
1971, RGANI, f.5, op. 63, d. 579, p. 266. The journalists’ description of Machel’s 
background is not fully correct. He was indeed a son of a peasant farmer, but of some status. 
This allowed Machel attend school and become a nurse's assistant, a profession he held in 
Lourenço Marques [Maputo] before joining the FRELIMO. See: I. Christie, Samora Machel: 
A Biography, London: Panaf, 1989. 
57 Mikhalev, Nikanorov, Shchashchaev (Lusaka) to Moscow, “Report on the Trip of Journalists 
and Cameramen in Semi-liberated Regions of Tete in Mozambique”, 7 August 1971, RGANI, 
f.5, op. 63, d. 579, pp. 265-266. 
58 Ignat’ev to Moscow, 18 October 1973, "Report about the Trip to Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, 
Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique”, RGANI, f. 5, op. 67, d. 897 
59 Informatsiya o Komandirovke v Angolu, 27 December 1974, AVPRF, F. 658, OP. 14, P. 
62, D. 1, p. 69 
60 O. A. Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our 
Times, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
61 O. Nazhestkin, "V Ognennom Koltse Blokady”, in: V. Karpov (ed.), Vneshnyaya 
Razvedka, Moscow: XXI Vek-Soglasie, 2000, p. 251 
62 O. Ignat’ev, Operatsiya Kobra-75, Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1978. 
63 Domoslawski, Ryszard Kapuscinski, pp. 214-215; Ryszard Kapuscinski, Another Day of 
Life, London: Penguin Books, 2001. 
64 Ignat’ev, Operatsiya Kobra-75, p. 178. 
65 P. Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976, Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002, pp. 307-311. 
